

POST-CARTESIAN IDEA OF PHILOSOPHY BETWEEN REPRESENTATION AND MOVEMENT

Temsil ve Hareket Arasında Post-Kartezyen Felsefe Tasarımı

Şefik DENİZ*

But movement is not understood here merely as motion from a place, local motion, but as any sort of movement, i.e., as μεταβολή, as the coming to presence of some alteration. Thus every πράξις, every νοεῖν, is a movement.

Martin Heidegger, Plato's Sophist.

ÖZET

İlk Grek düşüncesinden günümüze değin felsefi düşünce, varlık kavramı ile zamansal dünyayı birlikte açıklamakta güçlük yaşamıştır. Sürekli olan ile değişen hep birbirine çelişik olarak görülmüştür. Bu makalede amaç bu problemin post-Kartezyen felsefedeki izlerini çözümlemeye çalışmaktır. Pek çok felsefi tartışmada kendisini yineleyen ve Antik düşüncede varlık ve oluş problemi olarak kavramsallaştırılan, sürekli olan ile zamansal olanın bağdaştırılmasındaki güçlük olarak ortaya çıkan problemin post-Kartezyen felsefede özellikle mantık ve özgürlük kavramları etrafında yeniden şekillendiği tartışılacaktır.

Anahtar kelimeler: Varlık, oluş, mantık, özgürlük, zaman.

ABSTRACT

Since the early Greek, philosophical thinking has the difficulty relating permanent conception of being with the temporal world. The continuous one and the change have ever been considered to be contradicting with each other. The objective in this paper is to follow this problematic in post-Cartesian philosophy. It will be argued that the ancient difficulty of conjoining the permanent with the temporal, which principally sustains itself in all philosophical discussions, has turned over the problem of logic and freedom in post-Cartesian thought as the dilemma between representationalism and the idea of movement.

Key words: Being, becoming, logic, freedom, time.

INTRODUCTION

Russell (1964: 78) argues that all problems of philosophy could be reduced to the problems of logic, "every philosophical problem, when it is subjected to the necessary analysis and purification, is found either to be not really philosophical at all, or else to be, in the sense which we are using the word, logical." Logic, since the beginning of Western metaphysics is an instrument, *organon*, for an inquiry into the being. Since the beginning of philosophy, the duet of being and thinking challenging to the phenomenon of

* Yrd. Doç. Dr., Afyon Kocatepe Üniversitesi, Sosyoloji Bölümü.

becoming and to the world of change is the main way apprehending of being whatsoever it is. Yet, logic in essence has always trouble with the temporal world or change. At the beginning, if one of the main debates of Western thinking is between Sophists and Socrates about the universality of knowledge and values, the other dispute is between the proponents of being and becoming.

Plato is seen as the father of philosophy in the sense that this debate has a way out in his philosophy; nonetheless Plato's clarifications resulted in unending argumentations in many respects. Plato has fixed the problem of being in terms of theory of ideas, which are beyond the world of change and time and as to be seen and to be approachable only by the vision of mental power along with putting the world of change just as the shadows, or copies, of the genuine being. Though from some points Aristotle has followed his teacher's way, he has tried to integrate the two realms, i.e. of being and becoming, in terms of substantial ontology, by which he challenges the problem of the temporal being and aims to resolve the problem of change, *metabole*, as a movement, *kinesis*, from potentiality to actuality, from non-being to being. Aristotle defines time as *metron*, measure, of the change. (Aristotle, Physics; par.221b1) But the echo of the Parmenides' words has never loosed its effect in the history of Western thought, the world of change and movement has judged as a bothersome sound for the reasonably perfect duet of being and thinking. In the following pages this complicated question is to be worked out in modern philosophy as the problem of representation and movement and it will be argued that it essentially has hold over the problem of basing philosophical issues on either logic or freedom

To be sure, since Plato's simile of the cave and his theory of ideas, thinking has been identified with thinking of the otherworld. For Platonic thought, the world here and now, a perpetual state of flux or the world of ever-chancing of sensations has no essence in it. Our judgment concerning this ever-changing world leads us into uncertainty and contradiction. To Plato's mind, the genuinely real, something beyond the ever-changing flux, something unchangeable beyond the temporal world is to be found only in a higher realm, that is, in the world of universals. For Plato, this world we live in is a copy of the timeless world of ideas. The idea of the good, an idea of the ideas was the ground of all other ideas; it is the cause of their being, known, reality and of existence. The history of the Western philosophy is to be seen as a long effort to make the ever-changing world to his intellect a rational one. It is, in this sense a Platonic history, a series of replies given to the same problem, Platonic thinking is something a 'way down', from up to down. That experiment of thinking constitutes one of the most grandiose enterprises of the human intellect. It is an enterprise for understanding the world of change in terms of a rational, stationary and a constant world beyond temporality (Lovejoy, 1961b: 43-47).

The other course of thinking opposing to Platonic one opens the way for philosophy from the actual temporal world without appealing to any

transcendental argument, and hence it tries to seize the core of flux. Temporality and change is seen as the base of philosophical problems, rather than metaphysics of logic, it attempts to think in terms of the metaphysics of experience. Heidegger, in *Being and Time*, argues that philosophy is a hermeneutics of facticity and for Kierkegaard the question the constitution of the self lies in the Heraclitean flux. In the same line, according to Nietzsche, there is one only world, which is sensible, the world of change and becoming, that is the real and true world. Therefore, he destroys the classical fixed eternal concept of truth and defines it as something dynamic, changing and contradictory. The truth is a process something to be searched for and to be created having no an end, and to be not found or discovered, for this reason he argues that art is more than truth. For the philosophers for whom the world of change and time is the primal world thinking means to cope with the temporal world, thus the main task of philosophy is firstly and for the most part to identify with the play of factual life. It is a study which eliminates any transcendent descriptions and attempts to understand the question of human and of existence from the world of temporality and change.

Thinking in Greek Philosophy and Representationalism

Certainly, the crisis of the incompatibility of thinking change along with the rest could be traced back to the times of Parmenides and Heraclitus; the former has turned down the possibility of becoming, the latter has rejected the motionless being. However, since Plato's philosophy Parmenides' view has gained primacy over the other in the history of the Western thought, which asserts that the knowledge of the things could be attained only by circumventing and going beyond the temporal world until the knowledge of perennial, eternal ideas reached.

Rorty (1980:39) argues, in Greek world, philosophical contemplation for the knowledge of universal concepts and truth, *theoria*, makes the eye of mind the inescapable model for the better sort of knowledge. The eye of the mind, *nous* –thought, intellect, insight– has the capability of knowing eternal truths. Man's essence has been considered to discover the essences; Rorty (1980: 357) argues that;

The notion that our chief task is to mirror accurately, in our own Glassy Essence, the universe around us is the complement of the notion, common to Democritus and Descartes, that the universe is made up of very simple, clearly and distinctly knowable things, knowledge of whose essences provides the master-vocabulary which permits commensuration of all discourses.

Yet, as Heidegger (1977: 131) argues, Greeks have had no any word in their language which has meaning of representation. Since, for them knowledge of something was the apprehension of what-is, and representation is a modern thinking bases itself subjectivist ontology. But the way to the representative thinking was encoded in the Greek thought (Derrida, 1990:

115-120). Rorty (1980: 357-394), in this line, separates philosophy into two main streams, systematic and edifying philosophy. The first one tries to give a final vocabulary of eternal problems of philosophy and searches for universal commensuration of problems of knowledge about being, language, and history. The second one wants to keep space for the sense of which poets can sometimes cause. Its aim is not to put philosophy on the secure path of science, hence the truth; however as an endless process, thinking based essentially on the terms practical wisdom and freedom is the actualization of man in the temporal world by coping with the change and flux.

The formation of the representation theory to be sure is found in the Cartesian conception of man and being, as Dickerson (2003:5-6) points out, "the origins of this tradition lie in Descartes's rejection of the Aristotelian-Scholastic ontology and its accompanying account of human cognition. In standard Scholastic doctrine, human cognition occurred through, firstly, the reception of the 'sensible forms' or 'intentional species' of objects into the mind, and secondly, the performing acts of abstraction upon those sensible forms." Representation plainly both means to exhibit the image of and to present to mind; nevertheless a visual understanding of thinking in the history of the human spirit occurs firstly in the Greek world:

The hegemony of visual sense over other senses, which appears among the Greeks for the first time, as a tremendous new factor in the history of the human spirit, the very hegemony which enabled them to live a life derived from images and to base a culture on the forming of ideas, holds good in their philosophy as well. A visual, image of the universe (*weltbild*) arises which is formed from the sense-impressions and objectified as only the visual sense is able to objectify, and the expressions of the other senses are as it were retrospectively recorded in this picture. Even Plato's world of ideas is a visual world, a world of forms that are seen (Buber, 1975: 127).

Rorty (1980: 11) calls this understanding of knowledge Greek ocular metaphor. In this line, Pöggeler (1990: 80) argues that the conception of truth through the philosophy of Plato turns into idea, that is, it is related to making visible of something and its showing itself. Similarly, in the philosophy of Aristotle, *theoria* means looking at, viewing something, which in his metaphysics is the way for the truth. Clearly; as Philipse (1994: 5) argues "if one models universal knowledge on the paradigm of vision, one will think that there have to be universal objects which are perceived by the spiritual eyes." However differs from the Greek thinking, Cartesian philosophy gives a new vocabulary and redefines the ocular metaphor on subjectivism. Since, for Descartes subjective representation involves having true mental images of the objects, but for Aristotle and for Greek thinking in acquiring knowledge the mind becomes identical with the known object; Gadamer (1976: 27), regarding to Aristotle's *De Anima* (book III paragraph 4) argues that; "Aristotle is setting forth the truly speculative identity of subjective and objective as the culmination of his metaphysics." Furthermore, Descartes' philosophy makes subjective epistemology central

to metaphysics, in the Cartesian dictum *cogito ergo sum*, of which basis lies in the Cartesian search for an indubitable ground, subject's reason has come to mean self-consciousness with no essential bounds to anything else.

In discussing the relation between thinking and doing, Hannah Arendt asserts that thinking born in the Greek mind firstly is to mean the withdrawal from the involvement the world and doing, which in its early, original form rests on the discovery that the only spectator, never the actor, can know and understand whatever offers itself as a spectacle. In the Greeks, to theorize means to contemplate, Greek word for being a spectator is *theatai*, from which the word theory comes and the condition of truth is the withdrawal from the play of the life, "as a spectator you may understand the 'truth' of what the spectacle is about; but the price you have to pay is the withdrawal from participating in it. The first datum underlying this estimate is that only the spectator occupies a position that enables him to see the whole play – as the philosopher is able to see the *kosmos* as a harmonious ordered whole" (Arendt, 1978: 93). Thus, from the beginning in philosophy, thinking has been thought of in terms of visual metaphors and since thinking is the most fundamental activity, seeing has tended to serve as the model of perception in general and the measure of other senses.

Properly, in Greek thought, man is comprehended as a rational being in the world, not the vice versa, such a view forms the visual understanding of *kosmos*. The tendency of Greeks to understand the world as a self-contained space in which man too has his fixed place, was perfected in Aristotle's geocentric spherical system, as Buber (1975:127) figures out; "it was not before Aristotle that the visual image of the universe is realized in unsurpassable clarity as a universe of things, and now man is a thing among these things of the universe, an objectively comprehensible species beside other species – no longer a sojourner in a foreign land like the Platonic man." It is that Greek conception of cosmos and being which underlies the representative theory of man, as well Arendt (1978:143) claims that "philosophy begins with an awareness of the invisible harmonious order of *kosmos*" and "since Parmenides, the key word for this invisible, imperceptible whole implicitly manifest in all that appears has been Being, seemingly the most empty and general, the least meaningful word in our vocabulary" (Arendt, 1978:144). The corresponding part in man to being is the *nous* (Arendt, 1978:136); something which is the quintessence of *animal rationale*, Hofmann (1968:408) argues the same point as following;

The Greek tradition conceived the notion of the universe as a cosmos, a beautiful, harmonious, and a beneficent sphere. Human personality was viewed, in potentially, as the microcosm of the universe. Man's function was to mirror the macrocosm as perfectly as in his self, *nous*. His task was to recognize, identify with, and represent the perfect order.

This Greek understanding of man and world, or being, as the affinity between mind and reality, inaugurates the philosophy historically, and "Thales was the first thinker in the west to believe that the *arche* was

intelligible ... that there is continuity between the mind and the world out there that the mind thinks" (Roochnik, 1990: 138) which, formulated in Parmenides' words as being and thinking are the same. According to Heidegger (1968: 242) the words of Parmenides "becomes the basic theme of all Western-European thinking and the history of that thinking is at bottom a sequence of variations on this theme, even where Parmenides' saying is not specifically cited." In other words, since beginning, the supposed harmony of being and mind via forming the fundamental base of philosophy makes possible it. With Parmenides, the concept of being substituted the mythological gods and the essence of man has been defined in the identity of thinking and being (Arendt, 1978: 135-136). Habermas (1972: 307) arguing this point claims that "to identify of the individual ego as a stable entity can only be developed through identification with abstract laws of cosmic order. Consciousness, emancipated from archaic powers, now anchors itself in the unity of a stable cosmos and the identity of immutable Being." Clearly, being becomes the basic idea of metaphysical thinking and every idea relates to being, man signifies human being, god means divine being and everything which is *is* by any means. In Aristotle's substantial ontology, man is human being and god is divine being (Aristotle; *Metaphysics*, book 5, par.8). Between man and being the essential relation is that of intelligibility and truth is the name of such a relation; hence, in the traditional ontology, truth is defined as the agreement or conformity between thing and intellect. Therefore, as Louis (1961:77) argues "being and the true are convertible", which is the reason Aristotle's calling truth is another name for being.

As a result, in Greek world, thought-being relation is definitive of who we are. The world of ideas in the philosophy of Plato is in the static presence, which could be grasped only through perceiving the ideas and truth is the correctness of such mentally perception as the agreement between perceiving and the perceived. Thus, what we call Platonism is the understanding that true world could be reached by means of intellect rather than experience, truth or being is attained by going beyond experience; therefore contemplation or thinking is the universal way on which we define our essence. Man's self-constitution primarily is seen in seizing of what-is through *nous*, which gives the metaphysical conception of self identity issuing from Parmenides' dictum.

Throughout the history of philosophy the term metaphysics means a science which deals with the being itself, as Aristotle defined it as the science of being and traditional concept of metaphysics has two meanings, either the science of being as being or theology; which depends on Aristotle's understanding of *proto philosophia*. According to Aristotle the subject-matter of the first philosophy is both the question of being as such and also the question of the ultimate being. In a similar way, metaphysics has connected with theology in medieval age. Descartes in his major work *Meditations on First Philosophy* begins with the proof of the existence of

god, however with Cartesian doubt the fundamental character of metaphysics turns into the absolute certainty as the very foundation and the problem of metaphysics itself. Epistemology, in this sense, has been considered as a tool for such an absolute certainty and the Cartesian 'I' has become the starting point such an aim. In the Cartesian dualistic substantial ontology, the ego or subject is considered to be the absolute ground for representing the true world; and on the one hand, objective being is grasped in the mathematical and mechanical form, on the other hand the unity of being and thought asserted especially and firstly in the subjective sphere, within the 'I' itself. A philosophy initiating with the declaration *cogito ergo sum*, signifies the beginning of modern philosophy, something differs from the Greek mind, and Descartes views the moment self-consciousness as the absolute beginning point of philosophy, in the sense that we eliminate all presuppositions, and self-consciousness, firstly and for most part, is regarded the essential constituent of self. In other words, the identity of self is no more established in the harmony of identity of being and thinking as in the case of Greeks, but it is defined at the outset on the internal subjectivist base as the self-consciousness of thinking-being through leaving 'external sphere' as the objective world.

On the other hand, Kant's distinction in *Critique of Pure Reason*, between *Vernunft* and *Verstand* is a challenge against the classical metaphysics, i.e., against seeking the fundamental principles of being, or reality, through reason, since "he believed that he had discovered in practical reason the means to get at the domain of the noumen, which had been irremediably closed to speculative philosophy" (Louis, 1961: 5-6). According to Hannah Arendt (1978: 15), for Kant truth is limited to the realm of understanding and meaning is limited to the realm of reason, that is; "the need of reason is not inspired by the quest for truth but by the quest for meaning. And truth and meaning are not the same." In other words, thinking is what reason does -meaning- and knowing what understanding does -truth-. Yet, Kant closes the meaning question to reason itself arguing that human reason, when surpasses experience, goes to antinomies. The classical assertion about unity of being and thinking is only and partly possible in the sphere experience in terms of the unity of self-consciousness, i.e., the synthetic unity of apperception. The connection between subjective and objective worlds is the 'I think' that accompanies every representation which Kant calls *pure apperception* through which the 'I' unifies perceptions given in the manifold. Therefore, the 'I think' is the ultimate precondition for having an object of experience and has its task in the phenomenal world. For Kant, the unity of objective experience depends in the last analysis on the unity of the I which synthesizes categorical sets of thinking. As Hegel criticizes Kant, the identity of being and thinking is relative in Kant's philosophy, and Hegel takes the issue of his philosophy here, i.e., for him they are originally and absolutely identical, and Hincman (1984: 22-23) argues that "being as it is itself is for Kant originally different from thinking,

the only possible knowledge open to us is relative, that is, to the mind's capacity to 'legislate' for nature by means of the categories"

According to Kant, the noumenal world, the world of things in themselves, is unknowable to us and he develops his theory of critique as transcendental subjectivism, which, in its essence, is the unity of subjective mind and objective world, that is, phenomenal world. The self in the *Critique of Pure Reason* is the transcendental I who legislates for nature in the phenomenal world; however noumenal world is to be reached only in the moral law, which is out of chain of causality. For this reason, the fundamental idea in the philosophy of Kant is;

The first thing that the Copernican Revolution teaches us that it is we who are giving the orders. There is here an inversion of the ancient conception of wisdom: the sage was defined partly by his own submission, partly by his 'final' accord with Nature. Kant sets up the critical image in opposition to wisdom; we are the legislators of Nature (Deleuze, 1990: 14).

But, as Dickerson (2003:5) argues, "Kant stands in the great Cartesian tradition of representationalism." In transcendental philosophy, as Deleuze (1990: 14-15 ff) interprets, representation takes the form of the synthesis of that which is presented, the problem of the relation of the subject and object tends to be internalized having two fundamental parts, receptive sensibility and active understanding, apprehension and reproduction. Therefore, representation is both limited in the phenomenal world and redefined in the active sense. Dogmatism affirms a harmony between subject and object, and to Kant's mind this harmony remains incomplete in the speculative faculty, from which Kant passes to moral world, where the final harmony between subject and world occurs in terms of freedom. The highest interest of human reason is of practical –not theoretical- in terms of free will. This is what Kant calls 'legislation by the concept of freedom', which he contrasts with 'legislation by natural concepts'. The former legislates in the faculty of desire, the latter in the faculty of knowledge. Hence, the reason that rules the practical issues fulfills the rational end of human being, so freedom is the stand for the realization of final and fundamental task of human being, and furthermore "for his so-called 'practical reason' which he had the last word in his philosophy, gave forth metaphysical as well as ethical deliverances" (Lovejoy, 1961a: 13). Consequently, realization of man's inmost nature is possible just through practical reason, as Kant (1993: 128) himself argues in *Critique of Practical Reason*; "every interest is ultimately practical, even that of speculative reason being only conditional and reaching perfection only in practical use." In brief, for Kant, the final end to realize the man himself lies in not knowing the objective world, or in the absolute harmony between being and thinking, but in the moral law through which man by way of free will accomplishes his very end as a rational being.

Freedom and the Idea of Movement

Nietzsche in *The Will to Power* (par. 516) argues that logic, “like geometry and arithmetic, applies only to fictitious entities that we have created. Logic is the attempt to comprehend the actual world by means of a scheme of being posited by ourselves; more correctly, to make it formulatable and calculable for us.” Truth is the concept for classifying the phenomena in the manifold into definite categories and to be master over them. If truth would be possible, we would discharge from thinking in terms of becoming. Since, if we base our knowledge on becoming it will never be possible to speak of truth or falsity. Knowledge and becoming eliminate one another. For him to speak of being is a kind of deception. Time and motion are contradictory concepts for the possibility of logic and truth, since the fixed objects of thought are always easier for knowledge than the ever changing items of phenomena. The thought of the essence must be searched for in change and temporality; however, to think of in terms of timelessness is to be regarded just for assisting to make the harder to easy (Nietzsche, 1968: par. 1064). Happiness only can be assured by rejecting change; and hence being, for Nietzsche, is the name for the way to happiness. Contrary to the classical idea of thinking, he claims that “Parmenides said, one cannot think of what is not, we are at the other extreme, and say that what can be thought of must certainly be a fiction.” (Nietzsche, 1968: par. 539).

Like Nietzsche, Kierkegaard discards the possibility of eternal knowledge. The spirit of Kierkegaard’s thought falls on the anxiety of the groundless decision rather than the rational constitution of man’s choice. Meaning lies in subject’s experience, man’s affairs determine meaning. The subject is not a universal one, but one as the existing individual with no access to self-evident or divinely guaranteed criteria of judgment. He is a groundless ground rather than being grounded. For Kierkegaard, neither existence nor essence, and nor being and thinking make a coherent union, the existing individual finds himself in the abyss, in the absence of ground;

The Platonic conception of the return to ideas, and the identity of being and thinking is something that which is what is impossible for man’s essential nature –the Greek recollective theory-, since, for Kierkegaard only possible action to man is the movement forward, namely repetition. Only Aristotle in the Greeks has given an important issue to the concept movement. *Kinesis*, for Aristotle, is the movement from potentiality to actuality, which, according to Kierkegaard, is to be understood in terms of freedom, not of a logical possibility. Therefore, *kinesis*, properly posits movement (Caputo, 1987:16).

In this line, time is not a something passing away against which man is to persist, but authentic time lies in the future. Clearly, to Kierkegaard’s mind, the metaphysics of presence has always either denied or subverted time and motion, hence freedom has no a considerable point in Greek thinking. Greek understanding of man and being is of a logical one, but Kierkegaard, as a Christian thinker, develops his conception of man and

nature in terms of freedom, since the world has been created by the free act of divine will. Therefore, repetition has an ethico-religious meaning in Kierkegaard:

Repetition means the task set for the individual to preserve in time, to stay with the flux, to provide his identity as an effect. And this ultimately is the religious task. The highest expression of repetition is the religious movement in which the original passes from sin to atonement (Caputo, 1987:20).

For Kierkegaard, truth essentially is neither to know the permanent ideas beyond the sensible world and nor to represent objects to the mind, but truth must be understood in subjectivist terms in the sense that man's transcending is the actualizing himself in the face of chaos, therefore it has a temporal meaning, it is to move and to create an identity, to repeat oneself in new actual matters. In this line, freedom is the essence of the movement, contrary to Greek conception of man which essentially belongs to the truth; likewise, man is not in a Greek cosmos, i.e., an ordered world sets union with logic, but in the world of turmoil which opens itself only through man's steps forward to the future. In other words, freedom is to move forward in the temporal world, rather than becoming a beholder. In Kierkegaard's words (1983: 131); "repetition is a crucial expression for what 'recollection' was to the 'Greeks'. Just as they thought that all knowing is a recollection, modern philosophy will teach us that all life is a repetition. ... Repetition and recollection are the same movement, except in the opposite directions, for what is recollected has been, is repeated backward, whereas, genuine repetition is recollected forward." Recollection reminds us that we are product of our past, that we know who we are by remembering who we have been. But repetition affirms that our present self is also determined by the future, therefore our existence is yet open; "thus selfhood is a mode of being which sustains both the backward orientation of recollection and forward orientation of hope in the dialectical relation which is repetition" (Cole, 1971: 154). In the movement from past to future self actualizes himself in terms of freedom, and which yields truth, that is, subjectivity. The highest truth for human being is subjectivity, which is attainable for an existing individual. Properly, an objective understanding of truth means losing the subject, these two ways of questioning of human nature, that is, subjectivity and objectivity, are fundamentally opposite, only one of them is proper to human's being. Since, for Kierkegaard, selfhood lies in the subjectivity, he argues that the existing individual is in the truth even if he is related to what is not true objectively (Cole, 1971:150-151). Yet the concept of freedom is unfamiliar to Greek thinking, after Christianity West has been introduced with such a concept, though in Greek thought and in Aristotle's discussion of *phronesis* along with in his theory of choice we see man's rational deliberation related to practical affairs, Aristotle spoke voluntary choice, "however elaborate was the Aristotelian theory of choice conceived as a definition of will following upon a rational deliberation, yet it remains as a

fact that Aristotle spoke neither of liberty nor of the free will" (Gilson, 1950: 307). Though free will is a concept something different to Greek vocabulary, like truth it has remained as a fundamental concept in the thought of West after medieval age.

Following Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, Heidegger reinterprets the idea of movement in terms of the Greek concept truth. He goes back to the origin of the concept of truth in Greek language i.e., *aletheia*, that truth is not just the correspondence of the intellect with the thing, but truth is what is unconcealed from the concealed, which is based on the temporality of being of which origin is Dasein. The possibility of truth is dependent on the relationship between being and human Dasein, of which bottom lies both temporality and freedom. Therefore, his philosophy undermines the classical conception of metaphysics and takes the issue further, to the idea of movement, in Heidegger's own term, 'clearing'. He argues that "the essence of truth is freedom" (Heidegger, 1949: 303). This motto means that man frees what is concealed out of the concealment into the unconcealment, i.e., *aletheia*, truth. Heidegger (1949: 301) characterizes such freeing as behavior (*Verhalten*), which is possible on the overtness of man, "all behavior is 'overt' to what-is and all 'overt' relations is behavior." Only Dasein might have such a behavior which sustains itself in the open through which the truth of Being occurs, which Heidegger calls *Ereignis*, event of appropriation.

For Heidegger (1962: 171) "Dasein is its disclosedness", which means to be illuminated, to be cleared and Dasein as the being-in-the-world gets cleared in such a way that it is itself the clearing. To be cleared, for Heidegger, means transcending of Dasein both for itself and for the being of the beings other than Dasein, he argues that;

The beings surpassed in transcendence are not, however, only, those which are not Dasein. In transcendence Dasein surpasses itself as a being; more exactly, this surpassing makes it possible that Dasein can be something like itself. In first surpassing itself, the abyss (*Abgrund*) is opened up which Dasein, in each case, is for itself. This abyss can be covered over and obscured, only by because the abyss of being-a-self is opened up by and in transcendence (Heidegger, 1984: 182).

Heidegger, in the essay *What is Metaphysics*, argues that the prefix 'meta' in the concept metaphysics means the go over, - trans -, beings as such. Therefore, transcendence essentially means meta-physics, i.e., trans-physics, in the sense that "in the question concerning the nothing such an inquiry beyond or over beings as a whole, takes place" (Heidegger, 1998: 93). Hence, Dasein means the being held out into the nothing and the being of Dasein is essentially metaphysical and transcendental:

Holding itself out into the nothing, Dasein is in each case already beyond being as a whole. Such being beyond beings we call transcendence. If in the ground Dasein were not transcending, which now means, if it were not in advance holding itself out into the nothing, then it could never adopt a

stance toward beings nor even toward itself. Without the original manifestness of the nothing, no selfhood and no freedom (Heidegger, 1998: 93).

By its very nature, Dasein brings the 'there' along with itself (Heidegger, 1962: 171). Properly, the nature of freedom points to the previously unfamiliar meaning of being free. Since freedom is the ground through which the over character of behavior takes place. Freedom is a participation in the revealment of what-is, that is, truth itself. According to Heidegger (1949:301), "man does not 'possess' freedom as property, it is contrary that is true, freedom, or ex-sistent revelatory Da-sein possesses man." In *Being and Time* Heidegger analyzes the structure of the movement in terms of *wiederholung*, retrieval. Dasein's being captured in a circular way from past to future makes the future-oriented possibility of human, namely, the freedom of Dasein and the revealment of the truth of what-is, i.e., freedom, is what makes history, since the Heideggerian existing man moves historically with and through Being. However, the freedom of man is not to be taken in the absolute sense, that is, only in the subjective level, it is because that freedom is man's opening himself to the summons addressed to him by Being and the way on which he is already being sent. That sending is destined by Being itself. Clearly, freedom and the destiny of Being go together, which makes the history as the two ground. In this line, Heidegger reinterprets Parmenides' dictum being and thinking are the same, which, for him, means that Being belongs -together with thought - into the same. Identity is belonging together of being and thinking, which occurs in terms of event of appropriation (Heidegger, 1969: 31-36). Therefore, man's essence does not have a static character of *animal rationale* as in Greek thought, or the subject as in the modern philosophy and man in every phase of history of Being remains as an incomplete project of the truth of Being. Furthermore, Heidegger uses a metaphor for thinking listening - listening to Being - contrary to Greek visual metaphor, as the relation, or identity, between man and Being. Following Heidegger, Gadamer understands the hermeneutic project as an interpretive ontology in terms of recalling Aristotle's concept of *phronesis* in order to understand not only practical affairs but also metaphysical issues. His aim is to free philosophy from foundationalist way of thinking, in particular, from the kind of thinking which adopts the idea of the modern science as a model for philosophy.

CONCLUSION

In the beginning, I have argued that the since early Greek, philosophical thought has a difficulty jointly conceptualizing the continuous one and the change, i.e., the problem of being and becoming; and I have assessed this question as one of the main enigmas of philosophical thinking. In this line, I have argued that philosophical thought after Descartes has above all been divided into two ways. The first one, representationalism, depending on the logical conception of philosophy bears no notice of the temporal world, for

representationalism truth is defined essentially through epistemological terms, only Kant argued that our representations are restricted to the realm of phenomenon. Though representationalism belongs to modern thinking, it could reasonably be argued that its roots lie in Greek philosophy. The second one, that is, the idea of movement, takes its departure from the temporal world and bases philosophical thought on the world of change. Rather than epistemologically defined and already existing and a permanent truth claims, it insists on our freedom and argues that freedom and temporality are the most fundamental concepts on which one bases philosophical thought. The former's intellectual roots founds in Greek thought, yet the latter takes its origin from medieval ages, in the sense that it gives preference on human freedom and will, therefore regards time and history as the main possibility of understanding ourselves rather than logical and a preset constitution of being and man relation.

REFERENCES

- ARENDDT, Hannah. (1978), *The Life of the Mind: Thinking and Willing*, USA: Harcourt Brace Company.
- ARISTOTLE. (1991), *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, The Revised Oxford Translation, Princeton University Press.
- BUBER, Martin. (1975), *Between Man and Man*, New York Mcmillan Pub. Co.
- CAPUTO, John D. (1987), *Radical Hermeneutics: Repetition, Deconstruction and Hermeneutic Project*. Indiana: Indiana University Press.
- COLE, J. Preston. (1971), *The Problematic Self in Kierkegaard and Freud*. New Haven: University Press.
- DELEUZE, Gilles. (1990), *Kant's Critical Philosophy: The Doctrine of the Faculties*, Trans., H. Hamilton and D. Hebbertjen, Minnesotapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- DERRIDA, Jacques. (1990), *On Representation, "Transforming the Hermeneutic Context: From Nietzsche to Nancy"*, ed., G. L. Ormiston and A.D. Schrift, New York: State University of New York Press.
- DICKERSON, A.B. (2003), *Kant on Representation and Objectivity*, West Nyack, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.
- GADAMER, Hans-George. (1976), *Hegel's Dialectic: Five Hermeneutical Studies*, trans., P.C. Smith, New Haven: Yale University Press.
- GILSON, Etinne. (1950), *The spirit of the Medieval Philosophy*, trans by, A. H. C. Downes, Sheed & Ward, London.
- HABERMAS, Jurgen. (1972), *Knowledge and Human*, Trans. J. J. Shapiro, Boston: Beacon Press.
- HINCHMAN, Lewis. (1984), *Hegel's Critique of the Enlightenment*. Miami: University of Florida.
- HEIDEGGER, Martin. (1968), *What is Called Thinking*, Trans., J. G. Gray, New York: Harper and Row.
- (1949), *Existence and Being*, ed. Werner Brock, Chicago: Henry Regnery Co.

- (1962), *Being and Time*, Trans., J. Macquire and E. Robinson, New York: Harper and Row.
- (1969), *Identity and Difference*, Trans., J. Stambaugh, New York: Harper and Row.
- (1977), *The Age of the World Picture*, "The question Concerning Technology and Other Essays", ed., and trans., W. Lovitt, New York: Harper & Torchbooks.
- (1984), *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, trans., by Michael Heim, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, Indianapolis,
- (1998), *Pathmarks*, ed. by William McNeill, Cambridge University Press, printed in United States of America.
- HOFFMAN, Hans. (1968), *Order and Chaos: A Plea for Flexibility*, "The Concept of Order" Washington: University of Washington Press.
- KIERKEGAARD, Sören. (1983), *Fear and Trembling: Repetition* ed., and trans., H.V. Hong and E. H. Hong, Princeton, NJ. Princeton University Press.
- KANT, Immanuel. (1993), *Critique of Practical Reason*, trans., L.W. Duck, New York: Macmillan Publishing Co.
- LOVEJOY, Arthur O. (1961a) *The Reason, The Understanding and Time*, Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press.
- (1961a), *The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History an Idea*. Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
- LOUIS, De Raeymaeker. (1961), *The Philosophy of Being: A Synthesis of Metaphysics*, trans., E. H. Ziegmeyer, London: Herder Brack Co.
- NİETZSCHE, Friedrich. (1968), *The Will to Power*, ed. by Walter Kaufmann, trans. by Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale, Vintage Books, New York.
- PÖGGELER, Otto. (1990), *Martin Heidegger's Path of Thinking*, trans., D., Magurshak and S., Barber, USA: Humanities Press.
- PHILIPSE, Herman. (1994), *Towards a Postmodern Conception on Metaphysics: On the Genealogy and Successor Disciplines of Modern Philosophy*. Metaphilosophy, Vol. 25, No: 1.
- ROOCHNICK, David. (1990), *The Tragedy of Reason, Toward a Platonic Conception of Logos*, New York: Routledge.
- RORTY, Richard, (1980), *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- RUSSELL, Bertrand. (1964), *Logic as the Essence of Philosophy*, "Readings on Logic", ed., Irving M. Copi, James A. Gould, The Mcmillan Company, New York, Collier-Mcmillan, London.